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According to the classical quantificational analysis of modals, an agent
has the ability to perform an act iff (roughly) relevant facts about the
agent and her environment are compatible with her performing the
act. The analysis faces a number of problems, many of which can be
traced to the fact that it takes even accidental performance of an act
as proof of the relevant ability. I argue that ability statements are sys-
tematically ambiguous: on one reading, accidental performance really
is enough; on another, more is required. The stronger notion of ability
plays a central role in normative contexts. Both readings, I argue, can
be captured within the classical quantificational framework, provided
we allow conversational context to impose restrictions not just on the
“accessible worlds” (the facts that are held fixed), but also on what
counts as a performance of the relevant act among these worlds.
1. Introduction
It has long been noticed that modals in natural language behave much
like quantifiers over possible worlds.1 In this tradition, David Lewis
(1976, 150f.; 1979, 246f.) and Angelika Kratzer (1977) influentially sug-
gested that ‘S can φ’ (or ‘S is able to φ’) is true just in case there are
accessible worlds at which S φs, where a world is accessible just in case
it is compatible with contextually relevant facts about the actual world.
The quantificational analysis works well for statements like (1),
from (Kratzer, 1991).
(1) Hydrangeas can grow here.
In a suitable context, an utterance of (1) conveys that relevant facts
about the regional climate, soil, etc. are compatible with the growth of
hydrangeas. In other words, the utterance is true iff hydrangeas grow
at some possible worlds where these facts are held fixed.
However, when we turn to ‘can’ statements attributing abilities to
intentional agents, the quantificational analysis appears to run into
1. See (Copeland, 2002) for a partial history.
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trouble. Suppose Maisy wants to open a safe, but doesn’t know the
combination.2 Intuitively, (2) is then false.
(2) Maisy can open the safe.
On the quantificational analysis, this means that there are no accessible
worlds at which Maisy opens the safe. But all it takes to open the safe
is to dial the right combination. Let’s say the combination is 448-961-
5237. Surely Maisy can dial that combination. No relevant facts about
her inner state or her environment, it seems, are incompatible with her
dialling 448-961-5237. But if there are accessible worlds where Maisy
dials 448-961-5237, how could there fail to be accessible worlds where
she opens the safe?
Examples are easy to multiply. Suppose Cyril does not know the
first 10 digits of π. Intuitively, (3) is then false.
(3) Cyril can recite the first 10 digits of π.
But, we may assume, Cyril can utter any permutation of the numerals
‘three’, ‘one’, ‘four’, etc. One of these permutations lists the the first 10
digits of π. So it looks like there are accessible worlds at which Cyril
recites the first 10 digits of π.
One might try to get around these problems by tinkering with the
accessibility relation. We will see that this isn’t easy. It also doesn’t
seem to get at the heart of the problem. Intuitively, when we say that
someone can recite the first 10 digits of π, we don’t just mean that no
relevant facts preclude them from uttering ‘three, one, four,’ etc. Rather,
the agent must have a certain kind of intentional control over perform-
ing the act under the description of ‘reciting digits of π’. G.E. Moore’s
1912 conditional analysis gets closer to what is required. According to
Moore, ‘S can φ’ is true just in case S would φ if S tried to φ. If Cyril
tried to recite the first 10 digits of π, he would almost certainly fail.
Similarly, Maisy would almost certainly fail if she tried to open the
safe.
2. This example is borrowed from (Carlson, 1999).
To be sure, the conditional analysis also faces some well-known
problems. Among other things, it looks unappealing for sentences like
(1) or (4) or (5), which don’t seem to imply the kind of intentional
control implied by (2) and (3).
(4) My phone can connect to the WiFi network.
(5) Steel can withstand temperatures of 1000 °C.
Some have concluded that modal expressions like ‘can’ and ‘able’
are ambiguous between an agentive sense and a non-agentive or cir-
cumstantial sense. On this view, the classical quantificational analysis
may be adequate for the circumstantial sense, but not for the agentive
sense. Many attempts have been made to analyse the agentive sense,
but no consensus has emerged from these efforts.3 We still lack a clear
picture of what ‘can’ means in (2) and (3), and how this meaning is
related to the meaning in (1), (4), and (5).
I will argue that despite initial appearance, (2) and (3) can be
analysed in terms of simple, existential quantification over accessible
worlds. (2) is false because there are no accessible worlds at which
Maisy opens the safe – provided that accidental openings don’t count.
In general, I will argue that when we evaluate whether someone can or
cannot φ, conversational context may put restrictions on what counts
as a relevant way of φing. Sometimes accidental φing counts, some-
times not. As a result, ability statements are ambiguous between a
weaker reading, on which accidental φing suffices, and a logically
stronger reading, on which non-accidental φing is required.
That there is some such ambiguity is, I think, independently plausi-
ble. For example, although (2) is most naturally interpreted as false in
the described scenario, there is also a sense in which it is true. Maisy
can open the safe, insofar as she can dial 448-961-5237, and that’s what
she needs to do in order to open the safe. The false reading is more
3. See, among others, (Cross, 1986), (Brown, 1988), (Peacocke, 1999), (Mele,
2003), (Vihvelin, 2004), (Fara, 2008), (Maier, 2015), (Maier, 2018b), (Mandelkern
et al., 2017), (Jaster, 2020).
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salient, in part because the true reading is trivial: we would normally
take for granted that Maisy has enough control over her arms and
fingers to dial whatever combination happens to be the right one.4
The ambiguity is easier to see in cases where neither reading is
trivial. Suppose Eddie’s favourite piano piece is the Moonlight Sonata;
Charley can play the Moonlight Sonata, but he doesn’t know that it is
Eddie favourite piece. Now consider (6).
(6) Charley can play Eddie’s favourite piece.
True or false? Intuitively, the statement is true in one sense and false in
another. Informally, Charley can play what is in fact Eddie’s favourite
piece, but he can’t play it “under that description”. In contrast to (2),
here the weak reading is far from trivial: most people can turn the dial
on a combination lock, but few can play the Moonlight Sonata.5
At the other end of the spectrum lie statements like (7).
(7) Usain Bolt can run 100 meters in 9.58 seconds.
Here the weak reading is more salient. If someone utters (7), they plau-
sibly mean that Usain Bolt can do something that amounts to running
100 meters in 9.58 seconds – a highly non-trivial feat. The claim is not
that Bolt is able to perform the act “under that description”, mean-
ing that he can at will choose to run with an average speed of exactly
0.0958 m/s.
4. In addition, when we consider a sentence like (2), we are often interested
in what the agent ought to do. As we will see, this makes the strong reading
salient.
5. In (6), the description ‘Eddie’s favourite piece’ can arguably take either
narrow scope or wide scope over the modal ‘can’. If the description is given
wide scope, as enforced in (6′), the sentence is intuitively true.
(6′) Eddie’s favourite piece is something Charley can play.
One might conjecture that the ambiguity of ability modals is generally a de
re/de dicto ambiguity. However, (2) does not contain a relevant description (‘the
safe’ doesn’t help), yet it intuitively displays the same ambiguity as (6). Here
it’s as if the entire verb phrase ‘open the safe’ can scope over the modal, so that
(2) asserts of opening the safe that Maisy can do it. I will return to the relevance
of scope in footnote 29 below.
It will be useful to have labels for the two readings. If an agent has
the ability to φ in the weaker sense, I will say that she can φ effectively.
Maisy, for example, can do something – namely, dial 448-961-5237 –
that in effect amounts to opening the safe, although Maisy is not aware
of the connection between dialling 448-961-5237 and opening the safe.
If an agent has the ability to φ in the stronger sense, I will say that she
can φ transparently.6
I take both of these readings to express an agentive type of modality.
Compare (7) with (8), said about a statue precariously placed on a
ledge.
(8) The statue can easily fall.
The truth of (8) has nothing to do with the statue’s agency; (8) simply
states that a certain kind of accident could easily befall the statue. By
contrast, (7) does not say that a certain kind of running event could
easily befall Usain Bolt. If Bolt runs a race, he is exercising his agency.
Indeed, (2), (3), (6), and (7) could all be paraphrased with ‘able’
(unlike (8)), and the same ambiguity would arise. The ambiguity also
affects other ability modals like ‘in a position to’, as well as correspond-
ing necessity modals like ‘must’. It also arises for deontic modals. Sup-
pose Maisy is required by some normative code to dial 448-961-5237,
6. (Mandelkern et al., 2017, 320f.) also notice the effective/transparent ambi-
guity for a sentence like (2). They suggest that the two readings are analogues
of the objective/subjective ambiguity of deontic modals, arising from a tradi-
tionally neglected information sensitivity of ability modals. However, we will
see in example (9) below that possession of a transparent ability can depend
on external matters of which both agent and attributer are unaware. Moreover,
while the subjective reading of deontic modals is sensitive to information sup-
plied by ‘if’-clause (as highlighted in (Kolodny and MacFarlane, 2010)), the
reading on which (2) is false is not: on its most salient reading, (2′) is just as
false as (2).
(2′) If the combination is 448-961-5237, then Maisy can open the safe.
Third, as I’m just about to point out, the effective/transparent ambiguity
arguably also affects deontic modals, where it is orthogonal to the subjec-
tive/objective ambiguity.
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and (by coincidence) dialling 448-961-5237 is tantamount to opening
the safe. In one sense, then, ‘Maisy ought to open the safe’ is true,
although Maisy is not required to perform the act “under that descrip-
tion”.
I hope you see the ambiguity in (2), (3), and (6). Let’s try to get
clearer about the two readings. What is required for an agent to have
an ability in the weak, effective sense? And what is required to have an
ability in the strong, transparent sense? In the next section, I will sketch
a preliminary answer, tailored to a certain use of ability statements in
normative contexts. In the remainder of the paper, I will explore how
the two readings might fit into the classical quantificational paradigm.
To this end, I will first review the quantificational treatment of modals
in section 3, and defend it against a certain misunderstanding. In sec-
tion 4 I will motivate the idea that the interpretation of modals is sen-
sitive not just to contextual restrictions on the accessible worlds, but
also to restrictions on the interpretation of the embedded verb phrase
(the “prejacent”). The transparent reading of ability statements is then
easily explained by a non-accidentality restriction. In section 5 I will
sketch a few possibilities for how the non-accidentality restriction may
be compositionally derived. Finally, in section 6, I will show that the
proposed account defuses several prominent objections and counterex-
amples to the quantificational analysis of ability modals.
2. Oughts and cans
To get a better grip on the effective/transparent ambiguity, it will help
to begin with a particular class of ability statements, in which the sub-
ject is an intentional agent facing a particular choice.
In such a case, it is natural to ask not just what the agent can do
but also what she ought to do, or what she is obligated to do.7 The two
questions are related. If an agent isn’t able to φ, we typically wouldn’t
judge that she ought to φ: ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, as the saying goes.
Moreover, ‘ought’ plausibly implies ‘can’t do better’: an agent ought
7. I will ignore the difference between ‘ought’ and ‘obligated’ in what follows.
to φ only if there is no alternative act she could perform that is better
than φ.8
So normative judgements about what an agent ought to do are sen-
sitive to the what the agent can do, in some sense of ‘can’. This gives
us a job description for an analysis of ‘can’: the acts an agent can per-
form should be the options that are candidates for what she ought to
do. Let’s see what ‘can’ should mean if it is to fit that job description.
Here is a simple picture, or model, of rational agency. Voluntary
acts, we assume, are consequences of corresponding intentions or voli-
tions. When an agent deliberates about what to do and finally reaches
a decision, the direct result is not an overt act, but a volitional state
– an intention, or an all-things-considered desire, to perform a certain
act. Which volitional state comes about depends on the agent’s desires,
values, beliefs, and the process of deliberation. Other values, other be-
liefs, or other deliberational processes might lead to other volitional
states and consequently to other acts.
Normative judgements about what an agent ought to do are gener-
ally relative to norms and facts: in light of such-and-such norms and
such-and-such facts, the agent ought to φ. The judgement does not pre-
suppose that the agent knows the relevant facts or that she adheres to
the relevant norms. Thus it can easily happen that an agent ought to
φ (relative to some norms and facts) and yet chooses some alternative
φ′ because relative to her own information or her own values, φ′ is
preferable to φ. Roughly speaking, when we ask what an agent ought
to do (relative to such-and-such norms and facts), we want to know
what she would do if she were adequately responsive to the relevant
reasons. Any act the agent could have performed if only she were dif-
ferently motivated should therefore count as an available option. An
act is disqualified as an option only if no (reasonable) variation of the
agent’s volitional state would lead her to perform the act.
The parenthetical reasonability condition is meant to exclude voli-
8. (Portmore, 2019, ch.1) argues that any credible moral theory supports this
connection between ‘ought’ and ‘can’t do better’, possibly with minor caveats.
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tional states that are in a certain sense “unavailable” to the agent. If
an agent has severe arachnophobia, we may not want to say that she
ought to pick up a spider, even if doing so would have desirable con-
sequences. Here the volitional state of intending to pick up the spider
is treated as unavailable. I will have a little more to say on the role of
the availability restriction, but I will not try to spell out exactly what it
involves.9
Let’s say that an act is under an agent’s volitional control just in case
there is an available variation of the agent’s volitional state that would
cause her to perform the act. The picture of agency and normativity
just outlined suggests that when we consider what an agent ought to
do, the relevant options – what the agent can do, in the normatively
relevant sense of ‘can’ – are precisely the acts that are under the agent’s
volitional control.
But things are more complicated. Return to Maisy, standing in front
of the safe. On the present proposal, Maisy can open the safe (in the
normatively relevant sense), for there is an available variation of her
volitional state – namely, intending to dial 448-961-5237 – that would
cause her to open the safe.
But suppose Maisy could prevent some tragedy by opening the safe.
One might have thought that if an agent can perform an act that would
prevent a tragedy (at no significant costs), and if no other available act
would be comparably good, then the agent is obligated to perform that
act. More cautiously, one might have thought that at least if an agent
knows that she can perform an act that would prevent a tragedy etc.,
then she is obligated to perform the act. But on the proposed analysis
9. There are difficult normative questions here. Just how strongly must you be
afraid of spiders so that picking up the spider no longer counts as an available
option? Can ordinary intentions make incompatible intentions unavailable, as
in Goldman’s 1978 example of an agent who supposedly ought to accelerate
given her ill-advised intention to change lanes? Some have argued that there
are different notions of ‘ought’, corresponding to different rules for what is
treated as available (e.g. (Timmerman and Cohen, 2016)). If that is right, we
might want to allow for correspondingly different notions of ‘can’. The account
I will develop is neutral on these questions.
of ‘can’, Maisy can prevent the tragedy by opening the safe, and she
knows that she can. (She knows, we may assume, that some available
variation of her volitional state would cause her to open the safe.) Yet
it seems wrong to claim that Maisy is obligated to open the safe. We
certainly wouldn’t blame her if she doesn’t open the safe. So when we
consider what Maisy ought to do, we do not seem to count all the acts
that are under her volitional control as relevant options.10
In the previous section, I observed that sentences like (2) are am-
biguous. Maisy can open the safe in the weaker “effective” sense, but
she can’t open the safe in the more demanding “transparent” sense.
Plausibly, if an act is under an agent’s volitional control, then the agent
can perform it in the effective sense. To fit the normative job descrip-
tion, we need something stronger. This is, I think, where the transpar-
ent concept of ability comes into play.
As a first stab, a transparent ability to φ requires that the agent
can φ simply by deciding to φ. Since she doesn’t know the combination,
Maisy can’t open the safe simply by deciding to open the safe. While
there is an available volition that would cause her to open the safe –
namely, intending to dial 448-961-5237 – Maisy doesn’t know which of
the available volitions would do the job. Similarly for Cyril in (3) and
Charlie in (6). What Maisy, Cyril, and Charley lack is neither skill nor
opportunity, but plain old information. Due to their lack of informa-
tion, they don’t know what they would have to do in order to perform
the desired act.
So here is a tentative and preliminary analysis for the two reading
of ‘S can φ’ (and ‘S is able to φ’). The analysis will be generalised in
section 4.
10. One might bite the bullet and say that Maisy is indeed obligated to open the
safe, even though she isn’t blameworthy for flouting the obligation. As I will
argue below, this is not only counter-intuitive, it also fails to respect the “action-
guiding” or “advisory” role of oughts and obligations. If you’d nonetheless
prefer to bite the bullet, much of what I’m going to say could be recast in terms
of a connection between ‘can’ and blame rather than a connection between ‘can’
and ‘ought’.
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Analysis 1
a. S can φ (effectively) iff there is an available variation of S’s
volitional state that would cause S to φ.
b. S can φ (transparently) iff there is an available variation V of
S’s volitional state such that (i) V would cause S to φ, and (ii)
S knows that V would cause her to φ provided that φing is
under her volitional control.
I will explain the ‘provided that’ clause in a moment. First I want
to explain how abilities in the sense of Analysis 1b fit the normative
job description of delineating the options that are candidates for what
an agent ought to do.11
Consider what is required for an agent to be under an obligation to
perform a certain act. Arguably, the following two conditions are nec-
essary (though not sufficient). First, performing the act must be under
the agent’s volitional control: some possible variation of her motiva-
tional state would make her perform the act. That’s what condition (i)
gives us. But more is required. In addition, the agent must know what
she would have to do in order to perform the act. Condition (ii) en-
sures that if an agent can φ in the relevant sense, then she knows what
she has to do in order to φ (ignoring the proviso).
Exactly why that second condition is required depends on one’s
views about normativity, but here is a plausible sketch of an explana-
tion. A central role of normative judgements is often glossed as “moti-
vational”, “action-guiding”, or “advisory”. There is a close connection
between the assumption that an agent ought to φ and the assumption
11. If ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, and the relevant sense of ‘can’ involves condition (ii)
of Analysis 1b, we might expect to find a trace of that condition in the semantics
of ‘ought’. Indeed, recent accounts of deontic modals have appealed to some
such condition in order to give an adequate treatment of the “miner puzzle”
of (Kolodny and MacFarlane, 2010). For example, Charlow (2013) suggests that
the semantics of deontic modals involves an operation that filters out “non-
actionable” propositions, where a proposition φ is actionable iff there is some
“available act” A such that the relevant information entails A → φ. (See also
(Kolodny and MacFarlane, 2010, 132, fn.28).)
that it would be appropriate to advise the agent to φ. But if an agent
has no idea what she would have to do in order to φ, then it would not
be appropriate to tell her to φ. If you (as an advisor) know the safe’s
combination, you might reasonably advise Maisy to dial 448-961-5237.
Perhaps that is what Maisy ought to do in the “objective” sense of
‘ought’ – it is what she ought to do in light of all the facts. But advising
Maisy to open the safe would not be reasonable, no matter how good
it would be if she opened the safe. An advice only makes sense if the
recipient has some idea how she could follow the advice.
The advisory function of normative judgements also explains why
there should be an availability restriction on the relevant motivational
variations. If an agent has severe arachnophobia, there is little point
in advising her to pick up a spider. When giving advice, physiologi-
cal conditions that are insensitive to reason must be accepted as con-
straints.
Now let me explain the ‘provided that’ clause in Analysis 1b. Con-
sider the following scenario. Dotty has been led into a room with a
single door. There is nobody else in the room, the door is unlocked,
and Dotty could freely leave. However, she falsely believes (for good
reasons, if you want) that the door is locked. Can she open the door?
Intuitively, yes. That is, (9) does not fit into the pattern of (2), (3), and
(6).
(9) Dotty can open the door.
In contrast to the earlier examples, there is no relevant reading on
which (9) is false. Dotty believes that she can’t open the door, but her
belief is simply false. Dotty can open the door, and she can do it simply
by deciding to open the door.
Yet Dotty does not know that deciding to open the door would
cause her to open the door. On the contrary, she believes that nothing
she could decide would cause her to open the door. Without the pro-
viso in clause (ii), Analysis 1b would predict that (9) is false (on the
transparent reading of ‘can’); it would falsely predict that (9) patterns
with (2), (3), and (6).
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The proviso gets around the problem. Dotty does not know that
deciding to open the door would cause her to open the door, but she
plausibly does know that if opening the door is under her volitional control,
then deciding to open the door would cause her to open the door. In-
formally, if she were informed that she can open the door, she would
know how to go about achieving that result.
Notice how the judgement about (9) depends on the assumption
that there is only one door. Suppose there are three doors; Dotty be-
lieves that all of them are locked, but in fact one is unlocked. For some
reason, she can’t simply try all the doors to get out: if she were to try
a locked door, an alarm would ring and the unlocked door would lock
as well. With these changes, Dotty no longer knows what she would
have to do in order to leave the room, even on the supposition that it is
in her power to leave the room. Analysis 1b predicts (correctly, I think)
that Dotty no longer has the ability to leave the room in the strong,
transparent sense. She can leave the room, but only by luck.
How does the proviso in Analysis 1b fit the normative job descrip-
tion? Again, the details depend on one’s views about normativity, but
superficially the proviso goes well with the advisory picture. It would
not be reasonable to advise Maisy to open the safe, but it would be
perfectly reasonable to advise Dotty (in the original scenario) to open
the door.12
Analysis 1b is closely related to Moore’s conditional analysis, so a
brief comparison may be in order.13 Suppose an agent has an ability
to φ in the sense of Analysis 1b. That is, some variation V of her voli-
tional state would cause her to φ, and she knows that V would have
this effect (provided that φing is under her volitional control). Under
normal circumstances, trying to φ would then cause her to φ; so the
12. Of course, the advice would only be appropriate from a perspective in
which it is known that the door is unlocked. Thus in a more “subjective” sense,
relative to Dotty’s own information, it may still not be true that Dotty ought to
open the door.
13. Like Analysis 1b, Moore’s analysis arguably targets the normatively rele-
vant sense of ‘can’. It is not a coincidence that it is presented in a book called
Ethics.
agent also has the ability to φ in the sense of the conditional analysis.
An exception might be cases where the agent knows that she can per-
form a given act only by trying to perform a different act. I am not sure
whether, in such a case, the agent intuitively has or lacks the relevant
ability (in the transparent sense), and whether the act should count as
an option for normative purposes. As it stands, Analysis 1b says the
agent has the ability, while the conditional analysis says she does not.
The two accounts more clearly come apart in the other direction.
It can easily happen that an agent would φ if she tried to φ without
having the ability to φ in the sense of Analysis 1b. Notoriously, the
conditional analysis implies that arachnophobiacs can pick up spiders,
or that coma patients can get up and leave their bed (see (van Inwa-
gen, 1983, 119)); Analysis 1b does not have these consequences. More
tellingly perhaps, the conditional analysis faces problems with acciden-
tal success. Suppose if Maisy were to attempt to open the safe, 448-961-
5237 would be the first combination she would try – by sheer luck.
Would that render (2) unambiguously true? Arguably not. Or suppose
Maisy in fact tries to open the safe and happens to dial 448-961-5237.
Assuming that ‘A and B’ entails ‘if A were the case then B would be
the case’ (a popular, although not entirely uncontested assumption in
the logic of counterfactuals), the conditional analysis implies that (2) is
unambiguously true. But arguably, it is not.14
Some have suggested that just as one can try-and-succeed without
having the relevant ability, one can try-and-fail even though one has
the ability.15 John Austin’s classical example is of a golfer who kicks
himself for missing a putt, knowing that he had the ability to hole it
(under the given circumstances). That kind of case seems possible to
14. The judgement that even successful φing does not entail an ability to φ –
at least in some normatively important sense of ‘ability’ – is common in the
literature; see e.g. (Kenny, 1976, 214), (Fara, 2008), (Vihvelin, 2013, 182), (South-
wood and Wiens, 2016), (Maier, 2018b). Nonetheless, it sounds odd to say that
an agent is unable to φ and yet φs; I will return to this observation in section 5.
15. See (Austin, 1961), (Fara, 2008), (Vihvelin, 2004, 187), (Mandelkern et al.,
2017, 312).
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me. Analysis 1b gets it right, provided the golfer knows what he would
have had to do in order to make the putt.16
Note that in these cases, the conditional analysis not only fails to
match certain linguistic intuitions. More importantly, it fails to satisfy
the normative job description of identifying the acts an agent might be
obligated to perform. Maisy is not obligated to open the safe even if
she would succeed, by chance, if she tried.
By comparison, consider another apparent problem for the condi-
tional analysis: that it does not account for attributions of so-called
“general abilities”, as in (10).
(10) Charley can play the piano.
Suppose Charley, a skilled piano player, is currently on an Arctic expe-
dition on which he does not have access to a piano. There’s a natural
sense in which (10) is true, although it is not the case that Charley
would play the piano if only he tried. This is not a problem if our
target is the normatively relevant sense of ‘can’ (and ‘able’) that delin-
eates an agent’s options in a given choice situation. Without access to
a piano, Charley can’t be obligated to play the piano; while he is on
the expedition, playing the piano is not one of his options.
What (10) illustrates is that neither Analysis 1 nor the conditional
analysis will do as a fully general analysis of ability statements. We’ve
known this all along. A general analysis would also have to cover state-
ments like (1), (4), and (5), which intuitively have nothing to do with
tryings or volitions.17
16. Must the golfer be able to identify the volitional state that would have made
him succeed? See page 13.
17. John Maier (2015; 2018a) suggests that ability statements of all kinds can be
analysed in terms of an agent’s options. This is an overgeneralisation, I think. I
am also not sure how Maier’s concept of an option, which he takes as primitive,
is related to the normative job description I have outlined. For example, (Maier,
2018a, 424) states that whenever an agent φs, even by luck, then φing was an
option for the agent. This suggests that Maier’s options do not stand in any
simple relation to judgements about what the agent ought to do.
3. The quantificational canon
Let me recap where we stand. In the previous section, we looked at abil-
ity statements in which the subject is an intentional agent facing a par-
ticular choice. Such statements have a logically stronger and a weaker
reading. I have proposed an analysis of the two readings, which, I ar-
gued, fits an important role of ability statements in normative contexts.
We have also seen that the proposed analysis does not cover ability
statements like (1), (4), (5), or (10), which do not concern particular
choices of intentional agents.
A tempting response is to postulate further ambiguities. In the
philosophical literature, it is common to distinguish between attribu-
tions of “specific abilities”, concerning an agent’s options in a given
choice situation, and attributions of “general abilities” like (10) that do
not imply a present opportunity to exercise the ability.18 So perhaps
ability modals have not two, but four meanings: the effective and trans-
parent reading of “specific” ability modals captured by Analysis 1, a
third meaning for “general” ability statements like (10), and a fourth
(“circumstantial”?) meaning for (1), (4), and (5).
On closer inspection, however, the effective/transparent ambiguity
also arises for “general” and “circumstantial” ability statements. Take
(3): ‘Cyril can recite the first 10 digits of π’. This is naturally under-
stood as an attribution of a “general” ability: the statement may be true
even if Cyril does not presently have an opportunity to recite the digits.
But on that interpretation, the statement is intuitively still ambiguous
between a (relatively trivial) effective reading and a (non-trivial) trans-
parent reading. So we seem to have an at least six-fold ambiguity.
Things get worse if we try to spell out what some of the other mean-
ings might be. Return to (10). When we say that someone can play the
piano, we typically mean that they have certain lasting, intrinsic prop-
erties characteristic of piano players. In that sense, (10) can be true even
if Charley’s arm is broken so that he is temporarily unable to exercise
18. See e.g. (Austin, 1961, 230), (Honoré, 1964), (Whittle, 2010), (Mandelkern
et al., 2017), (Maier, 2018a).
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his ability. In another sense, however, a broken arm renders (10) false.
In yet another sense, (10) can be true even if Charley has not taken
any piano lessons, as long as he could acquire the capacity to play
the piano with sufficient training and practice. (Imagine Charley has
a disability, and we consider which musical instruments his disability
would allow him to play.) Alternatively, one could use (10) to convey
that Charley not only has the capacity to play the piano, but could also
bring about an opportunity with reasonable effort: returning from his
expedition, Charley (still in the airport) might say how glad he is that
he can now once again play the piano.
So there isn’t a single “general” reading of (10). Depending on con-
text, there seems to be an almost open-ended range of things one can
express with a sentence like (10).19
Yet other uses of ‘can’ and ‘able’ don’t seem to fit into any of the
above six categories. Consider (11) and (12).
(11) I can’t come to the party; I need some rest.
(12) I can’t come to the party; I have to look after my children.
These are “specific” ability statements insofar as they concern a partic-
ular choice of an intentional agent, but their most salient interpretation
is not captured by Analysis 1 (or the conditional analysis).
At this point, the strategy of postulating brute ambiguities begins
to look unappealing. It is hard to believe that words like ‘can’ and ‘able’
just happen to have dozens of distinct meanings. (And we haven’t even
touched on deontic or epistemic uses of ‘can’.) At the very least, we
would like to know what all these meanings have in common.
Here the quantificational analysis of modals shows its strength. On
the quantificational analysis, ‘can’ and ‘able’ belong to a larger family
of modal constructions all of which are analysed in terms of quantifi-
cation over a restricted domain of (“accessible”) possible worlds. An
agent can φ iff she φs at some accessible worlds; an agent must φ iff she
19. Essentially the same point is made in (Kratzer, 1981).
φs at all accessible worlds; and so on. The analysis is meant to cover
all uses of ‘can’, from (1) to (12).
Let’s be clear about what the quantificational analysis is trying to
achieve. Take a particular ability, such as Charley’s ability to play the
Moonlight Sonata. What makes it the case that Charley has this abil-
ity? Intuitively, the ability is grounded in certain physiological features
relating to finger dexterity, hand coordination, muscle memory, etc. –
features Charley has acquired through years of piano practice. The
quantificational account instead seems to suggest that Charley’s ability
is grounded in facts about other possible worlds: Charley has the abil-
ity to play the Moonlight Sonata, here in our world, because there is
some other world where he (or worse, someone else, see (Lewis, 1986,
ch.4)) plays the Moonlight Sonata. That sounds wrong.20
Similar complaints have been raised against other applications of
possible-worlds semantics, such as the Lewis-Stalnaker account of
counterfactuals, or the analysis of physical necessity in terms of nom-
ically possible worlds.21 But these complaints misunderstand the aim
of possible-worlds semantics. Charitably understood, the analysis of
modal constructions in terms of possible worlds is not meant to iden-
tify the metaphysical grounds of the relevant phenomena. Nor is it
meant to offer a substantive reduction of the phenomena to psychologi-
cally more basic concepts. It is merely supposed to offer a useful frame-
work for modelling the phenomena themselves. As Lewis explains, in
response to the objection that counterfactuals are made true by facts
about our world:
[It] is indeed the character of our world that makes the coun-
terfactual true. But it is only by bringing the other worlds into
the story that we can say in any concise way what character it
takes to make what counterfactuals true. The other worlds pro-
vide a frame of reference whereby we can characterise our world.
(Lewis, 1986, 22)
20. See e.g. (Vetter, 2013) for this kind of complaint.
21. See also the “Humphrey objection” in (Kripke, 1980, 44f.).
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In the quantificational analysis of ‘can’ and ‘able’, the substance
lies in the accessibility relation. Typically, accessibility is a matter of
preserving certain features of the agent and her environment. When we
say that Charley can play the Moonlight Sonata, for example, we hold
fixed Charley’s finger dexterity, muscle memory, etc. It is Charley’s
possession of these features, here in our world, that explains why he
plays the Moonlight Sonata in some accessible world and therefore
why he can play the Moonlight Sonata back in our world. As in the
case of counterfactuals, the other worlds merely provide a convenient
frame of reference for characterising the actual world.
What is convenient about the quantificational analysis becomes ap-
parent once we look at more examples and a wider range of contexts.
Recall the many things one could convey by (10). When we consider
whether someone can play the piano, we sometimes hold fixed a bro-
ken arm; sometimes we don’t. Sometimes we hold fixed lack of training
and practice; sometimes we don’t. Sometimes we hold fixed circum-
stantial absence of a piano; sometimes we don’t. Metaphysically, there
is little all these readings of (10) have in common, and there is even
less they have in common with (5), (9), or (11). By refraining to give a
substantive analysis, the quantificational analysis is able to bring out a
common theme.
The simple quantificational analysis that I have presented has un-
dergone many refinements in recent decades. For example, Kratzer
(1981; 1991) argued that the worlds over which modals quantify are
some sometimes restricted not just by relevant facts but also by the
satisfaction of salient norms or goals. This shows up in (11) and (12).
When we evaluate ‘I can’t come to the party’, we plausibly hold fixed
the speaker’s location, her obligations, her needs, etc. But that is not
enough to render (11) or (12) true. After all, there are worlds where I
come to the party despite my contrary needs or obligations. One could
postulate that these worlds are not accessible. But then accessibility
could no longer be understood in terms of facts we intuitively hold
fixed. Kratzer instead makes the interpretation of ‘can’ relative to a sec-
ond contextual parameter: an “ordering source” which ranks possible
worlds by the extent to which they satisfy relevant norms or goals or
standards. ‘S can φ’ is true (roughly) iff S φs in some of the top-ranked
worlds among those compatible with the facts we hold fixed.
Glossing over some further refinements, the lexical entry for ‘can’
may therefore look approximately as follows:22
[[can]]w,R,≤ = λP<s,<e,t>>λxe.∃w′(wRw′ ∧ ∀w′′(wRw′′ → w′′ ≤ w′)
∧ P(w)(x) = 1).
Here, w is the world of evaluation, R is a contextually supplied relation
encoding the facts about w that are held fixed, and ≤ is a contextually
supplied partial order that ranks w′ above w′′ just in case w′′ better sat-
isfies relevant norms or goals or standards. (If no standards are salient,
all worlds are ranked equally.) ‘S can φ’ is true at w iff S φs in some of
the highest-ranked worlds R-related to w.
The quantificational analysis not only brings out a common theme
in ability statements; it also explains how the ability sense of ‘can’ is re-
lated to the ‘can’ of permission (‘can I leave now?’), the epistemic ‘can’
(‘you can’t have seen her, she’s overseas’), and genuinely circumstan-
tial or “participant-external” uses of ‘can’ in statements like (8) or (13)
that can’t be paraphrased with ‘able’ (in contrast to all other examples
in this paper).
(13) It can take years to earn someone’s trust.
On the quantificational account, all of these involve existential quan-
tification over possible worlds.
22. I here assume that ‘can’ is of type << s, et >, et >, taking as argument a
verb phrase that denotes a property; Kratzer instead assumes a “raising” anal-
ysis on which ‘can’ is of type < st, t >. The raising analysis helps to account
for “participant-external” uses of ‘can’ like (8) and (13) below, where ‘can’
scopes above tense and aspect. Genuine ability modals, however, are always
“participant-internal”, scoping below tense and aspect. Whether separate lexi-
cal entries are required for participant-external and internal modals is an open
question. See (Brennan, 1993) and (Hacquard, 2010) for relevant discussion.
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Necessity modals like ‘must’ are similarly analysed in terms of uni-
versal rather than existential quantification. Thus we can explain why,
say, ‘I must sneeze’ is equivalent to ‘it is not the case that I can not
sneeze’.
The quantificational account has other attractive features. For ex-
ample, it allows an attractive explanation for the interaction between
‘can’ and ‘if’ in sentences like ‘I can dance if nobody is watching’,
where, on the most natural interpretation, the if-clause has neither
wide scope nor narrow scope, but rather seems to restrict the set of
worlds over which the modal quantifies (see (Kratzer, 1986), compare
(Horgan, 1979, 350)). The account also explains why ‘ought’ implies (a
specific kind of) ‘can’: if S φs in the normatively best of the contextu-
ally accessible worlds – as ‘S ought to φ’ states – it follows that S φs in
some contextually accessible worlds – as ‘S can φ’ states.
In sum, the popularity of the quantificational analysis in formal
semantics is not a historical accident. If we wanted to trade the quan-
tificational analysis of (2) for, say, a broadly conditional analysis (as
many recent accounts of agentive modals suggest), we would need an
explanation of what this conditional sense of ‘can’ has to do with the
obviously related sense of ‘can’ in (7), (10), (11), and (12), let alone (1),
(5), and (8). We would also need a new explanation of the connections
between ‘can’, ‘must’, and ‘ought’, of the interactions between ‘can’
and ‘if’, and a long list of other facts I haven’t even mentioned.
On the other hand, the quantificational analysis of ability modals
seems to face a number of decisive objections. One of these is the prob-
lem I mentioned in the introduction (I will turn to others in section
6): the analysis does not seem to capture the transparent reading of
sentences like (2), (3), and (6). Let me go through the problem again.
Maisy is standing in front of a safe, whose combination – unbe-
known to Maisy – is 448-961-5237. Intuitively, (14a) is true while (14b)
is false (on its more salient transparent reading).
(14) a. Maisy can dial 448-961-5237.
b. Maisy can open the safe.
The quantificational analysis easily accounts for the truth of (14a): since
Maisy has the skill and opportunity (although possibly not the mo-
tivation) to dial 448-961-5237, there are accessible worlds where she
dials that combination. But then how could there fail to be accessi-
ble worlds where Maisy opens the safe, so that (14b) comes out false?
We would have to assume that when we evaluate (14a), worlds where
Maisy opens the safe by dialling 448-961-5237 are accessible, but these
same worlds become inaccessible when we evaluate (14b). But why?
What other worlds become inaccessible when we evaluate (14b)? Re-
member that accessibility is supposed to track certain facts about Mary
that we intuitively hold fixed. What are these facts in the case of (14b),
and why can’t we hold them fixed when we evaluate (14a), which does
not have a salient false reading? Why does (14b) become true if Maisy
gains information about the safe’s combination?
As we saw in section 2, when we look at Maisy’s options, it is nat-
ural to hold fixed Maisy’s general physiology and macroscopic envi-
ronment, because these are insensitive to reason, while allowing her
volitional state to vary. But that would render (14b) true. Indeed, what-
ever facts we hold fixed, the actual world itself will always come out
as accessible (from itself). Yet in section 2 we saw that on the norma-
tively relevant reading, ‘S can φ’ may be false even if S actually φs. So
we would have to invoke an ordering source. Perhaps worlds at which
Maisy performs an act by luck or accident are ranked lower because
these acts don’t conform to the ideal standard of intentional agency?
The problem is that any world at which Maisy intentionally dials 448-
961-5237 is a world at which she unintentionally opens the safe. So
invoking the suggest ordering source would predict that (14a) is false
as well.
This is not an impossibility proof. All I claim is that I don’t see a
natural way to account for the transparent reading of ability modals
by tinkering with the accessibility relation or other parameters in the
standard quantificational model. We need to introduce another param-
eter.
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4. Restricting the prejacent
When we talk about whether someone can or cannot φ, we sometimes
have in mind a particular way of φing. Consider a well-known puzzle
from action theory. Tallulah’s left arm is paralysed. So (15) is intuitively
false.
(15) Tallulah can move her left arm.
But suppose Tallulah’s right arm is not paralysed. As a consequence,
she can move her left arm, the way she can move a cup on the table: by
grabbing it with her right arm. That’s not the kind of moving we have
in mind when we deny (15). When we judge that Tallulah can’t move
her left arm, we mean that she can’t move her left arm “actively”, using
the muscles in the arm. On its most salient interpretation, the truth of
(15) therefore seems to require not just that there are accessible worlds
at which Tallulah moves her left arm. There must be worlds at which
she moves the arm “actively”. Holding fixed Tallulah’s paralysis, there
are no such worlds. Hence (15) is false.
Another puzzle that points in the same direction concerns the qual-
ity threshold for ability attributions. Assume it took Charley many
years of practice to become good at the piano. At what point along
this journey did (10) (‘Charley can play the piano’) become true? Even
before his first lesson, Charley was able to produce sounds by push-
ing the keys on a piano. But this is usually not what we have in mind
when we say that someone can (or cannot) play the piano. We mean
that they can (or cannot) play reasonably well. What that means depends
on conversational context. Simplifying a little, let’s imagine that every
instance of piano playing can be assigned a scalar performance level
taking into account both the difficulty of the piece and the quality of
the play.23 We might then explain the context-dependence of (10) by
assuming that context fixes a minimal performance level so that (10)
23. The simplification is that these two aspects, and various sub-aspects in
which they could be decomposed, can be measured on a single scale. I also
ignore the obvious vagueness in (10).
counts as true iff there are accessible worlds at which Charley plays
the piano at a level that exceeds the threshold.
So there is evidence that when we evaluate ‘S can φ’, conversational
context can restrict what counts as a relevant act of φing among the
accessible worlds. This, I suggest, is also how the transparent reading
of ability statements comes about.
Return once more to Maisy in front of her safe. Since Maisy can dial
448-961-5237, by ordinary standards there will be accessible worlds at
which she opens the safe. But in all these worlds she opens the safe by
luck. When we judge that Maisy can’t open the safe, we don’t mean
that she can’t do it by luck. We mean that she can’t open the safe in
the deliberate, controlled, conscious, non-accidental way in which she
could open it if she knew the combination.
It is not terribly important for my proposal how the relevant way of
opening the safe should be spelled out, but let me venture a suggestion,
in line with what I suggested in section 2.
Consider what would change if Maisy knew the combination. Sur-
veying the worlds that would result from some variation of her voli-
tional state, we would then find not just worlds where she opens the
safe by luck, but worlds where she knowingly opens the safe – that is,
where she opens the safe while knowing that she is opening the safe.
However, imagine Maisy (not knowing the safe’s combination) is
wired to a brain scanner that would immediately signal to her that she
is about to open the safe once it detects an intention to dial 448-961-
5237. In this scenario, Maisy knowingly opens the safe in any relevant
world where she forms the intention to dial 448-961-5237. Yet intu-
itively, the presence of the brain scanner makes not difference to the
falsity of (2).
So it matters how Maisy comes to know that she is opening the safe
in the accessible worlds. Loosely speaking, if Maisy knew the combi-
nation, she would know that she will open the safe without drawing
on further information from the world.
I therefore suggest the following schematic analysis.
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Analysis 2
a. S can φ (effectively) iff there are (highest-ranked) accessible
worlds at which S φs.
b. S can φ (transparently) iff there are (highest-ranked) accessi-
ble worlds at which S φs transparently.
S φs transparently iff S φs as a result of a volitional state that
warrants believing that she will φ provided that φing is under
her volitional control.
Following Kratzer, I assume that a contextual ordering sometimes
restricts the modal domain, as in (11) and (12); hence the restriction
to ‘highest-ranked’ worlds. The ‘provided that’ clause in the definition
of transparency mirrors the ‘provided that’ clause in Analysis 1. Re-
member (9): Dotty can open the door (transparently) even though no
decision Dotty could make would, by itself, warrant believing that she
will open the door. Nonetheless, a decision to (try to) open the door
would warrant believing that if she can open the door, then she will open
the door. By Analysis 2b, this is enough to render (9) true.
In contrast to Analysis 1, Analysis 2 leaves open how the accessible
worlds are determined. In the kinds of cases we studied in section 2,
where we consider what an agent should do in a given choice situation,
a world is accessible iff it is under the agent’s volitional control – that
is, iff it would result from some available variation of the agent’s voli-
tional state.24 In other cases, other facts are held fixed. (3), for example,
allows for a similar range of uses as (10), depending on which facts
about Cyril and his environment we hold fixed. Each of these uses has
an effective and a transparent reading.
Even if the standards for accessibility are determined by what’s
under the agent’s volitional control, Analysis 2b is not fully equiva-
lent to Analysis 1b. For one thing, Analysis 1b seems to require that
the agent can somehow pick out in advance the volitional state(s) that
24. Here I’m assuming that there is always a single world that would determi-
nately result from any available volitional state. This is arguably an idealisation.
would make her φ; Analysis 2b does not. Moreover, while Analysis 1b
requires knowledge, Analysis 2b only requires having a warrant for
(true) belief. Among other things, the two analyses therefore give dif-
ferent verdicts about Gettier cases: if you’re looking at a stopped clock
that happens to show the correct time, and you have reason to believe
the clock works, Analysis 2b says that you have the (transparent) ability
to tell the time, while Analysis 1b says that you don’t. In these respects,
it seems to me that Analysis 2b is superior to Analysis 1b, but I won’t
argue the point.
As I said, I am not particularly wedded to the precise definition of
transparency in Analysis 2b. My proposal is that ‘S can φ’ is true on
its transparent reading iff there are accessible worlds at which S φs
in a particular way – a way that plays an important role in normative
contexts. For the sake of concreteness, I have tried to spell out that
way, but I would not be surprised if my attempt needs revisions or
amendments.
I have used an artificial adverb ‘transparently’ in Analysis 2b, but
it may well turn out that the relevant restriction matches some more
familiar concept. In particular, it may be worth exploring whether abil-
ities in the transparent sense can be analysed as abilities to intention-
ally perform the relevant act, in some ordinary sense of ‘intentionally’.
According to one influential tradition in action theory, intentional ac-
tion is distinguished precisely by the agent having non-observational
knowledge of what she is doing (see e.g. (Anscombe, 1957), (Velleman,
1989), (Setiya, 2008)).
Let’s briefly consider what Analysis 2 says about “compulsion
modals”, the dual of ability modals. These are often expressed with
‘must’, ‘have to’ or ‘cannot but’:
(16) I have to sneeze when I look at the sun.
(17) One cannot but admire her determination.
As Mandelkern et al. (2017) point out, many prominent analyses of
ability modals (such as the conditional analysis) make unacceptable
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predictions about compulsion modals, assuming these are equivalent
to ‘not can not’.
Analysis 2 allows for two kinds of compulsion modals. If ‘can’ is
read effectively, an agent cannot not φ iff the agent φs at all (highest-
ranked) accessible worlds. This seems to be the standard interpretation
of compulsion modals. On the transparent reading, an agent cannot
not φ iff the only (highest-ranked) accessible worlds at which the agent
doesn’t φ are worlds where she non-transparently doesn’t φ. Since the
“non-transparent” reading of compulsion modals is more common, but
ability modals are often interpreted transparently, we can explain why
negating an ability modal often does not entail a corresponding com-
pulsion modal: Maisy can’t open the safe, but we may be reluctant to
say that she cannot but fail to open the safe. She could get lucky.25
5. The mechanism
I have argued that when we evaluate ‘S can φ’, conversational context
can restrict what counts as an instance of φing among the accessible
worlds. “Passive” arm movements are excluded in (15), inept piano
performances in (10), and non-transparent safe openings in (2). But
how exactly does context achieve this? What is the underlying linguis-
tic mechanism?
Technically, we could include the restriction in the accessibility re-
lation. There are R-accessible worlds at which an agent φs ψly just in
case there are R∗-accessible worlds at which the agent φs, where R∗ is
defined (for example26) as follows:
wR∗w′ ⇔ wRw′ and the agent φs ψly at w′.
So we could in principle get the transparent reading of ‘can’ statements
25. Why do we normally interpret compulsion modals effectively? I’m not sure.
Perhaps it’s simply because the transparent reading is more complicated and –
unlike transparent ability modals – does not serve any obvious cognitive role.
26. Other definitions of R∗ would also work, but none of them, I think, is much
better than the one I chose.
by applying the ∗ operation to the standard accessibility relation deter-
mined by whatever circumstances are held fixed.
This “explanation” not only robs the accessibility relation of its in-
tuitive meaning, it also relocates the requested mechanism into the
wastebasket of pragmatics. Somehow or other, it assumes, conversa-
tional context may settle that the ∗ operation is applied to the relevant
facts. Note also that if R∗ is the accessibility relation, then ‘S can φ’ is
true iff there are accessible worlds, full stop. We don’t have to require
that the agent φs at some of these worlds; the definition of R∗ already
ensures that.27 Clearly, accessibility is here doing too much work.
It would be better to add the required restriction as a separate pa-
rameter, making the interpretation of ability modals depend on the
relevant circumstances, given by R, possibly an ordering to deal with
cases like (11) and (12), and a further contextual restriction C imposed
on the modal domain (compare (Dorr and Hawthorne, 2013)). The new
parameter C would have to be highly sensitive to the modal’s prejacent:
when we evaluate (14b) (‘Maisy can open the safe’), the parameter nor-
mally rules out worlds at which Maisy opens the safe by luck; when
we evaluate (14a) (‘Maisy can dial 448-961-5237’), the same restriction
is unavailable. Again, one would like to know more about the mecha-
nism behind this behaviour.
An more perspicuous option would introduce a parameter ψ of
adverbial type that doesn’t restrict the modal domain, but the inter-
pretation of the prejacent. Intuitively, ψ supplies a relevant way of per-
forming an act: actively, transparently, etc. The full semantics of ‘can’
might then look more or less as follows:
[[can]]w,R,≤,ψ = λP<s,<e,t>>λxe.∃w′(wRw′ ∧ ∀w′′(wRw′′ → w′′ ≤ w′)
∧ ψ(P)(w)(x) = 1).
27. As a corollary, if we assume that the effective/transparent ambiguity also
arises for necessity modals (as I argued on p.3), and that the same accessibility
relation is often available for both types of modals (as seems required to explain
various entailment facts), we get the false prediction that the transparent ‘can’
is equivalent to the transparent ‘must’.
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Semantically, the modifier ψ is simply passed on to the embedded verb
phrase: S canactively φ iff S can perform the act of actively φing.
On this approach, we don’t have to postulate that the choice of
prejacent in (14a) and (14b) somehow determines a different value of
the contextual parameter: if ψ imposes a transparency condition, (14a)
is true and (14b) false, without any change in contextual parameters.
Other explanations might also be worth considering. For example,
one might suggest that the relevant verb phrases are simply ambigu-
ous, so that the effect has nothing to do with modals. On that approach,
‘open the safe’, for example, can mean either open the safe transparently
or open the safe in some way or other. We get the transparent reading
of ‘can open the safe’ if conversational context makes the first reading
salient. To handle (15) and (10), we would similarly have to assume
that ‘move’ is ambiguous between move actively and move in some way
or other, and that ‘play the piano’ has a variety of readings with differ-
ent degrees of demandingness.
An advantage of this approach is that would explain the oddity of
statements like (18).
(18) Maisy wasn’t able to open the safe, but she did open the safe.
According to Analysis 2b, an agent can lack a transparent ability even
if she accidentally performs the relevant act. (In section 2, I argued
that this is in line with the normative job description for transparent
abilities.) So (18) should sound fine. But it does not. On the present
proposal, this could be explained by a preference for a uniform resolu-
tion of the ambiguity in ‘open the safe’. (18) is then ambiguous between
(19a) and (19b), both of which are contradictory on the quantificational
analysis (in the absence of an ordering source).28
(19) a. Maisy wasn’t able to open the safe transparently, but she
did open the safe transparently.
b. Maisy wasn’t able to open the safe in some way or other,
but she did open the safe in some way or other.
28. Thanks to Brian Rabern for drawing my attention to this point.
However, the oddity of (18) is arguably related to that of (20), which
the ambiguity hypothesis doesn’t explain.
(20) Maisy was able to open the safe, but she didn’t open the safe.
In the semantics literature, the phenomenon illustrated by (18) and
(20) is known as “actuality entailment”. (Hacquard, 2009), drawing on
(Bhatt, 2006), offers a promising explanation within the quantificational
framework that does not postulate an ambiguity of the prejacent.
In any case, one would like to see independent evidence for the
supposed ambiguities. Indeed, the ambiguity hypothesis implies that
(21) has a false reading if Maisy opened the safe by luck, not knowing
the combination.
(21) Maisy opened the safe.
As far as I can tell, such a reading does not exist. Even if Maisy only
opened the safe by luck, (21) is unambiguously true.
Instead of postulating lexical ambiguities, one might appeal to a
pragmatic or semi-pragmatic mechanism. McCawley (1978) pointed
out that the use of a simple verb phrase sometimes implicates that an
event takes place in a stereotypical way. Along these lines, one might
suggest that the transparent reading of ‘can φ’ arises as a conversa-
tional implicature. Unlike ordinary conversational implicatures (and
unlike the cases in (McCawley, 1978)), however, this supposed impli-
cature seems to arise even in questions: if Maisy doesn’t know the
combination, the most natural answer to ‘can Maisy open the safe?’ is
‘no’.
Another (semi-)pragmatic process that might do the job is “free
enrichment”. A number of authors (including (Hall, 2008), (Carston,
2010), (Recanati, 2013)) have suggested that when we process utter-
ances, we often supplement the uttered sentence by unarticulated con-
stituents that don’t have to be pronounced because they can be taken
for granted in the relevant context. Thus one might suggest that ‘Maisy
can open the safe’ is often “enriched” to ‘Maisy can open the safe trans-
parently’, whereas (for some reason) no corresponding enrichment is
philosophers’ imprint - 15 - vol. 20, no. 6 (february, 2020)
wolfgang schwarz Ability and Possibility
possible for ‘Maisy did open the safe’.
I have to leave a more thorough investigation of these and other
possible mechanisms for another occasion. Whatever the underlying
linguistic mechanism, I hope I have made it plausible that the trans-
parent reading of agentive modals might arise through a contextual re-
striction on the interpretation of the embedded verb phrase – by which
‘S can φ’ is interpreted as ‘S can φ ψly’ – and that postulating such a
restriction is not entirely ad hoc, as the same kind of mechanism ar-
guably explains the context-sensitivity of (15) and (10).29
6. Defending the canon
I now want to briefly revisit some objections that have been raised
against the quantificational analysis of ability modals. As we will see,
they all involve the transparent sense of ability and are easily answered
by the tweaked version of the quantificational analysis that I have out-
lined.
The first objection might be called the no-fluke argument. (It is related
to an objection to the conditional analysis that I mentioned in section
2.) On the quantificational analysis, an agent has the ability to φ as long
as she φs in some accessible world. Often, however, an agent intuitively
lacks the ability to φ even if her skills and the relevant environmental
circumstances are compatible with her φing. To use the standard ex-
ample from (Kenny, 1976), suppose Betsy is a novice dart player who
can barely hit the board. If we look at accessible worlds where Betsy
attempts to hit the bullseye, we find the dart landing all over the place.
In a few of these worlds (loosely speaking), the dart happens to hit the
bullseye. The quantificational analysis therefore seems to imply that
(22) is true. But intuitively, it is not.
29. In footnote 5, I mentioned another possible mechanism: scope. I argued
that this explanation would not be sufficiently general. But we can now see
why scope does play a role – for example, why (6) is intuitively true if ‘Eddie’s
favourite piece’ is given wide scope. According to Analysis 2, the wide-scope
statement is true (on its transparent reading) iff, informally speaking, there is
some x such that (a) x is Eddie’s favourite piece, and (b) Maisy has the ability
to play x transparently. Is there such an x? Yes: the Moonlight Sonata.
(22) Betsy can hit the bullseye (on the next throw).
The ability attributed in (22) seems to require a kind of robustness: it
shouldn’t be a mere fluke that the agent succeeds if she tries.30
In response, we need to distinguish the effective and the transpar-
ent reading of (22). On its effective reading, (22) is plausibly true: it
is in Betsy’s power to do something that amounts to hitting the bulls-
eye. This reading usually isn’t salient, but it could be made salient by
supplying more context. For example, imagine Betsy has been in an ac-
cident and is slowly regaining the ability to move her arm. We discuss
how far she could throw a dart in her present state. More precisely, we
discuss which points on the wall she could reach if she were to throw a
dart from where she is standing. Any point above a height of 3 meters
on the wall is ruled out, but points below 2 meters within a certain
radius are not. If the bullseye falls in that region, we could truly utter
(22). (And we would thereby attribute an ability to Betsy – we wouldn’t
just express that it could happen that Betsy hits the bullseye.)
In normal contexts, however, (22) is understood transparently, and
this reading really does call for a revision to the classical quantifica-
tional analysis. On the account I have outlined, (22) requires that there
are accessible worlds at which Betsy hits the bullseye transparently. In
these worlds, Betsy must have reason to believe that she will hit the
bullseye merely on the basis of a relevant decision. By normal acces-
sibility standards, there won’t be any such worlds. So (22) comes out
false.
In general, the transparency condition in Analysis 2b ensures that
the relevant success events aren’t mere flukes. But note that the no-
fluke requirement is epistemic: by Analysis 2b, if an agent has a trans-
parent ability, then from her own epistemic perspective it is not an acci-
dent if she succeeds. It is not required that the agent succeeds across
a whole range of worlds, under varying environmental circumstances.
30. Several alternatives to the quantificational account have been developed
around this intuition; see e.g. (Nowell Smith, 1960), (Brown, 1988), (Greco,
2007), (Vihvelin, 2013), (Maier, 2018b), (Jaster, 2020).
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The difference shows up in unusual cases like the following. Suppose
Betsy has been informed by a time-traveller that if she will throw the
next dart, then she will hit the bullseye. Arguably, that renders (22)
true, even on its transparent reading. So a transparent ability to hit
the bullseye does not require general skill or success across a range of
circumstances.
A second, though related, objection to the quantificational account
is what I’ll call the argument from general abilities. (22) attributes a “spe-
cific” ability, talking about what Betsy can do in her present circum-
stances. Now we focus on “general” ability statements in which the
present circumstances are not held fixed. The objection is that what-
ever we say about specific abilities, general abilities surely require more
than successful performance at a single accessible world.
To illustrate, consider (3): ‘Cyril can recite the first 10 digits of π’. As
mentioned earlier, this is naturally understood as attributing a “general
ability”. When we say that someone can recite the first 10 digits of π,
we normally mean that they can do so systematically, whenever the
need arises – in good weather and in bad weather, in the morning and
in the evening.
In response, we again need to distinguish the effective and the trans-
parent reading of the relevant statements. The objection is most plausi-
ble for the transparent reading, which is also more salient for sentences
like (3). On the account I have outlined, an agent has the transparent
ability to recite the first 10 digits of π just in case there is at least one
accessible world at which she transparently recites the digits. Suppose
there is such a world. In that world, the agent knows that she is reciting
the first 10 digits of π merely on the basis of her decision to utter a cer-
tain sequence of sounds. That is, she knows that uttering those sounds
would amount to reciting the first 10 digits of π. How could she know
this? Most likely because she knows what the first 10 digits of π are.
So if the transparent reading of (3) is true, then there are accessible
worlds at which Cyril knows the first 10 digits of π.31 But whether or
31. This ignores the proviso in Analysis 2b. In fact, according to Analysis 2b, it
not an agent knows the first 10 digits of π is plausibly one of the as-
pects of the actual world that we tend to hold fixed when we evaluate
statements like (3). That is, if Cyril doesn’t actually know the first 10
digits of π, then he also doesn’t know them in any accessible world.32
The hypothesis that an agent transparently recites the first digits of π
in some accessible world therefore implies that she knows what these
digits are in all accessible worlds. And this, in turn, implies that across
the accessible worlds, the agent almost always succeeds to recite the
first 10 digits of π when the need arises, irrespective of the weather or
the time of the day.
The upshot is that the account I have outlined vindicates the intu-
ition that “general abilities” like the one attributed in (3) imply success-
ful performance across a wide range of trying circumstances, without
explicitly putting this into the semantics.
To see why the wide range of circumstances shouldn’t be built into
the semantics, consider a variant of (7):
(23) Usain Bolt can run 100 meters in under 10 seconds.
It is unlikely that Bolt is right now in a position to run 100 meters in
under 10 seconds. Perhaps he has only just woken up, has just eaten,
is in an airplane, is not wearing his running gear, etc. The sense in
which (23) is true (or was true until recently) is therefore a “general”
sense. However, unlike (3), (23) does not imply successful performance
across a wide range of circumstances. On the contrary, it is enough if
there are a few, fairly special conditions under which Bolt can run
100 meters in under 10 seconds. The hypothesis that “general abilities”
require success across a variety of circumstances would get (23) wrong.
The account I have outlined gets it right: holding fixed Bolt’s general
physiology and strength, but possibly varying his environment, his
would suffice for the truth of (3) if (say) Cyril gives credence 0.4 to the digits
being 3, 1, 4, 1, 5, 9, 2, 6, 5, 3 and much lower credence to every other possibility.
That seems correct to me.
32. As usual, the standards depend on context: ‘Can you recite the first 10 digits
of π for this video I’m making?’ – ‘Sure. What are they?’
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state of alertness, etc., we find some worlds at which he runs 100 meters
in under 10 seconds – including some at which he knows from the
outset that he is going to achieve this goal. That is enough to render
(7) true, even on its transparent reading. 33
Let me turn to a third objection, due to Kenny (1976): the argument
from non-distribution over disjunction. Imagine a well-shuffled deck of
cards, lying face-down on the table. Can you draw a card that’s either
red or black? Sure: any card will do. But can you specifically draw a
red card, in a single try? Arguably not. Nor can you specifically draw
a black card. So (24a) seems to be true while (24b) and (24c) are false.
(24) a. You can draw a red or black card.
b. You can draw a red card.
c. You can draw a black card.
The problem is that if ‘can’ is an existential quantifier over accessible
worlds, then ‘can(φ or ψ)’ should entail ‘can(φ) or can(ψ)’: if there are
no accessible worlds where you draw a red card, and none where you
draw a black card, how could there be accessible worlds where you
draw a card that’s either red or black?
You can probably anticipate my response. First, (24a)–(24c) are am-
biguous between an effective reading and a transparent reading. Since
the effective reading is trivial for (24b) and (24c), the transparent read-
ing is more salient.34 And the transparent ‘can’ really does not dis-
33. Other mechanisms might also play a role in generating the apparent ro-
bustness requirement in many “general” ability statements. For example, the
claim that steel can withstand temperatures of 1000 °C, might be understood
to mean that steel can withstand such temperatures under otherwise normal con-
ditions, even if the actual utterance context is non-normal. Here a stereotypical
ordering source seems to be in play (compare (Kratzer, 1981, 60f.)). Or suppose
you can only play the piano in a dark and quiet room at temperatures below
freezing, and you know that I am looking for a pianist to entertain a group of
children. Here it would be misleading to say, without further qualification, that
you can play the piano, even if what you say is literally true.
34. Without further context, arguably neither reading is definitely favoured –
especially in the presence of (24a), which is trivial on either reading. This
might explain why some authors have resisted Kenny’s argument, suggest-
tribute over disjunction: there may well be accessible worlds where
you φ-or-ψ transparently even though there are no accessible worlds
where you φ transparently nor worlds where you ψ transparently. So
(24b) and (24c) can be false while (24a) is true.
Finally, the argument from hyperintensionality. Intuitively, (25a) is true
while (25b) is false.
(25) a. Cyril can recite the sequence 3, 1, 4, 1, 5, 9, 2, 6, 5, 3.
b. Cyril can recite the first 10 digits of π.
The prejacents in (25a) and (25b) are strictly equivalent: there is no
possible world at which anyone recites 3, 1, 4, 1, 5, 9, 2, 6, 5, 3 without
reciting the first ten digits of π, or the other way round. But if the set
of possible worlds at which an agent φs is identical to the set of worlds
at which she ψs, the quantificational analysis implies that the agent has
the ability to φ just in case she has the ability to ψ. So how can (25a)
and (25b) differ in truth-value?
Again, you can probably anticipate my response. On their (non-
salient) effective reading, (25a) and (25b) really do stand and fall
together. But on their more salient transparent reading, they can
come apart. The hyperintensionality comes from the hyperintension-
ality of warrant and belief: if Cyril does not know the first digits of
π, there can be accessible worlds at which he transparently recites
3, 1, 4, 1, 5, 9, 2, 6, 5, 3 even though there no worlds at which he trans-
parently recites the first 10 digits of π.
7. Conclusion
In the recent literature, a near consensus has emerged that the agentive
sense of ‘can’ (that may be paraphrased with ‘able’) defies the classi-
ing that (24b) and (24c) are actually true.
In my own experience, the longer I think about sentences like (24b)
and (24c), or indeed (2), (3), or (6), the more I become inclined to say that
they are true. For some reason, the effective reading seems to become more
salient. If the transparent reading arises through a contextual restriction on the
interpretation of the prejacent, this might be explained by the well-known fact
that it is generally easier to lift a contextual restriction than to re-impose it.
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cal quantificational account of modals. I have resisted this consensus.
On the account I have outlined, ‘can’ always functions as an existential
quantifier over possible worlds; different uses of ‘can’ largely corre-
spond to different ways of determining the domain of quantification.35
All else equal, I take it that a unified analysis is preferable. Across
a wide range of languages, the same lexical items are used to express
agentive modality and other kinds of modality. That can’t be a coin-
cidence. What’s more, the agentive ‘can’ shares many logical and lin-
guistic peculiarities with other uses of ‘can’, such as the way it interacts
with ‘if’-clauses or its tendency to trigger “free choice” effects.36 The
quantificational account explains these preculiarities. It also unifies the
bewildering variety of subflavours within ability modals, as we saw in
section 3, and it explains the connection between ability modals and
other modals.
The main obstacle for a quantificational treatment of ability modals
arises from what I have called their “transparent” reading. To get
around this, I have suggested that conversational context may impose
restrictions on what counts as a performance of the relevant act among
the accessible worlds. On the transparent reading, an agent has the
ability to φ iff there are accessible worlds at which she φs simply by
deciding to φ – more precisely, as the result of a decision that warrants
believing that she will φ, provided φing is under her volitional control.
Why should we be interested in this peculiar sense of ability? Be-
cause it plays a central role in normative contexts, when we consider
what an agent in a given choice situation ought to do. Informally, an
act is a candidate for being obligatory only if the agent knows what she
35. The determination depends on syntactic position: above aspect, ‘can’ tends
to have an epistemic reading, below aspect it is circumstantial or agentive. See
(Hacquard, 2009), (Kratzer, 2013).
36. An example of a free choice effect is the inference from ‘I can come to-
morrow or on Friday’ to ‘I can come tomorrow’. This is arguably a pragmatic
phenomenon akin to a scalar implicature. (Note that ‘I can’t come tomorrow’
does not seem to imply ‘I can’t come tomorrow or on Friday’). As Nouwen
(2018) points out, popular explanations of this effect assume that ‘can’ is an
existential quantifier over possible worlds.
would have to do in order to perform the act. The transparent concept
of ability is tailored to this normative job description.
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